1. Introduction: the Korean Peninsula crisis and coercive policy / 2. Coercive inducement: normative dilemmas and historiographical debates / 3. A cognitive theory of deterrence / 4. Deterrence and compellence in the Gulf, 1990-91 / 5. Paradoxes of coercive diplomacy in the Kosovo crisis / 6. U.S. coercive diplomacy toward North Korea: the case of the first nuclear crisis / 7. Wrong war, wrong pace, wrong time: why military action should not be used to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis / 8. North Korea's nuclear program: the role of incentives in preventing deadly conflict / 9. All the players at the table: a multilateral solution to the North Korean nuclear crisis / 10. The peace and prosperity policy and the South-North relationship: evaluation and future tasks / 11. Peace regime in Korean Peninsula and 'peace and prosperity policy': theoretical debates / 12. Conclusion: the North Korean nuclear crisis and the six-party talk