Cover image for Vietnamese communists' relations with China and the second Indochina conflict, 1956-1962
Vietnamese communists' relations with China and the second Indochina conflict, 1956-1962
Ang, Cheng Guan.
Personal Author:
Publication Information:
Jefferson, N.C. : McFarland, [1997]

Physical Description:
ix, 321 pages ; 23 cm
Format :


Call Number
Material Type
Home Location
Item Holds
DS560.69.C5 A54 1997 Adult Non-Fiction Central Closed Stacks

On Order



Based on Vietnamese, Chinese, American and British sources - many only recently made available - this work examines Sino-Vietnamese relations in the early stages of the second Indochina conflict. The progression of the Vietnamese Communists' goals from primarily political to essentially military is traced.

Reviews 1

Choice Review

Ang's important book covers a crucial yet underresearched period in the development of the Indochina wars. Using previously unavailable Chinese- and, especially, Vietnamese-language sources reinforced by US and British archives, Ang establishes a solid narrative of how the relations between Hanoi and Beijing evolved from 1956 to 1962. He analyzes the interplay of domestic politics, the role of individual leaders, and the changing international conditions, and points out that Vietnam's "Southern Revolution" was triggered in the first place by Ngo Dinh Diem's ruthless suppression of communist forces remaining in South Vietnam after 1954. Hanoi's decision early in 1959 to "renew the struggle in the South" was not favored by Moscow and received only nominal initial support from Beijing. Because the crisis in Laos intensified in 1960-61, Hanoi was able to reach a consensus with Beijing on the necessity of promoting the "Southern Revolution," which finally led to Beijing's commitment to support the revolutionary struggle in South Vietnam in summer 1962. Ang asserts convincingly that although China's role during this period should never be discounted, it was the Vietnamese communists who "were remarkably in control of their own decision making." Ang also plausibly argues that despite differences within the Vietnamese leadership over strategies and tactics, Hanoi's decision-making elites were characterized by cohesion rather than by factionalism. A welcome addition to collections on the Indochina wars. Upper-division undergraduates and above. J. Chen Southern Illinois University at Carbondale