Cover image for To Afghanistan and back : a graphic travelogue
To Afghanistan and back : a graphic travelogue
Rall, Ted.
Personal Author:
Publication Information:
New York : Nantier, Beall, Minoustchine, [2002]

Physical Description:
112 pages : illustrations, maps ; 24 cm
General Note:
Maps of Central Asia on endpapers.
Program Information:
Accelerated Reader AR UG 7.5 5.0 84913.
Format :


Call Number
Material Type
Home Location
Item Holds
DS352 .R25 2002 Adult Non-Fiction Non-Fiction Area

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When US bombs started raining on the Taliban, Rall was the only cartoonist to head straight to the war zone to get the real story for himself. But within days of arriving, armed men were hunting down journalists to murder and rob them. Waving cartoons didn't help. From the gruesome spectacle of a Taliban prisoner blowing himself up with a grenade, to the hilarious image of mujahideen lining up for shaves and watching porn with the Northern Alliance, Rall has a decidedly different take on this gritty war. Rall's articles and photos are included with this graphic travelogue.

Author Notes

Ted Rall, 39, is a syndicated cartoonist and columnist for Universal Press Syndicate. Twice the winner of the Robert F. Kennedy Journalism Award and a Pulitzer Prize finalist, Rall's interest and expertise in Central Asian history and politics has led him to frequent travels throughout the region, including a visit to Turkmenistan sponsored by the U.S. State Department. He lives in New York with his wife Judy

Reviews 3

Booklist Review

Late last year editorial cartoonist Rall, whose inflammatory work makes his colleagues' work seem timid as a Jay Leno monologue, traveled to Afghanistan to discover the effects of the U.S. bombing campaign on ordinary people there. His «graphic travelogue,» drawn in his characteristically quirky, vaguely cubist style, discloses that life under the Northern Alliance differs little from life under the Taliban; that virtually nothing is the way it appeared on CNN; and that being a war correspondent is harrowing and dangerous--3 of the 45 reporters who entered the country with Rall were killed within two weeks. In addition to the comic-strip center section, the book includes more traditional, albeit heavily opinionated, reportage that first appeared in the Village Voice. If Rall's approach lacks the nuance and sophistication of his fellow war-zone comics-journalist Joe Sacco, his rage over U.S. policy, which he views as driven by vengeance and oil, gives his reporting undeniable power. For alternative views of post-9/11 politics, don't pass up this small, potent volume. Gordon Flagg.

Publisher's Weekly Review

Rall (2024) is a talented comics artist and a contrarian journalist who has challenged what he perceives to be sacred cows by calling Pulitzer Prize-winning comics artist Art Spiegelman overrated and labeling some September 11 widows as golddiggers. This book records his experiences during a trip to Afghanistan during the U.S. bombing. It includes prose columns Rall wrote for the Village Voice and a graphic novel that captures his talent for smart, ironically comic observation even in hellishly dangerous circumstances. A longtime visitor to and commentator on Central Asia, Rall knows his way around war-torn nations. He journeys by convoy with about 45 journalists, separating himself from them by his determination to travel simply and cheaply. And what a trip: eight journalists are killed by the time he reaches eastern Afghanistan. He must deal with finding a warm place to sleep, keeping his phone charged ($40 a day) and the constant worry of being killed by Afghani soldiers or U.S. bombs. Rall slams victory claims in a war in which adversaries simply change sides when they lose. He suffers a procession of Afghanis out to hustle him for money and lampoons the media for covering the conflict as if it were another celebrity murder trial. But Rall's claims about clueless media reporting aren't fully true (there were regular U.S. press accounts of both civilian casualties and violent ground conditions), and his diatribes about U.S. military action suggest that, to be valid, every war effort must be perfectly executed. Nevertheless, his book joins Joe Sacco's accounts of life in Palestine and Bosnia as a tremendous contribution to comics war journalism. (Aug.) (c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved

School Library Journal Review

Adult/High School-For those who have come to the realization that learning about Afghanistan, the "war on terrorism," and Islam is of paramount importance but who have little inclination to turn to the many weighty tomes on these subjects, Rall's "graphic travelogue" just may start them on their way. The author, a journalist who spent time in Afghanistan during the U.S.'s military strikes, fascinates and appalls with this undiluted account. He spent three weeks in a "14th-century" country with only five paved roads, where sleeping in unheated rooms with fleas and scorpions were the norm, and where both 11-year-old soldiers and exploding grenades and bombs were commonplace. He describes corruption and treachery, violence, and death; he records the murder of a journalist "killed for his money" the same night he barely escaped a similar fate. By turns cynical, angry, and ironic, Rall's slim record reminds readers of the difficulties-and danger-of culture clash and points out the "Escheresque conundrum" facing the United States as a result of 9/11. His views run counter to current, uncritical jingoism, yet for that reason are noteworthy and valuable. With introductory chapters on Afghanistan, 9/11, and the military campaign; a graphic center section; and a post-mortem, this essay/editorial/illustrated travelogue will challenge readers, provoke many thoughtful discussions, and kindle interest in a people and place.-Dori DeSpain, Fairfax County Public Library, VA (c) Copyright 2010. Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.



Giving War A Chance NEW YORK, October 24 So we're going to war against Afghanistan. Big deal. We've been at war with Afghanistan for years. This New War is merely an escalation of genocide by trade sanction, this time with a few old-fashioned bombs and covert commando raids thrown in for popular effect. And while the explosions will look cool on cable TV news and the vague rumors of American death squads trekking through the mountains will sound dashing in a Rudyard Kipling-cum-Rambo kind of way, it will accomplish exactly nothing. On the other hand, this brand of ham-fisted foreign policy ensures that America will never run out of enemies. On September 24th, Secretary of State Colin Powell promised that the Bush Administration would finally cough up definitive proof of Saudi dissident Osama bin Laden's involvement in the suicide plane bombings of the Pentagon and World Trade Center: "I think in the near future, we will be able to put out a paper, a document, that will describe quite clearly the evidence that we have linking him to this attack." For the sake of argument, let's assume that Powell is telling the truth: that bin Laden, and by extension his Taliban hosts in Afghanistan, financed, ordered or otherwise directly participated in the murder of 3,000 Americans. Clearly, then, bin Laden ought to be hunted down and captured "dead or alive," in the John Wayne-informed lexicon of our appointed acting president. The Taliban should likewise suffer political capital punishment-being deposed by an overwhelming invasion force. Under military occupation, bin Laden's Al Qaeda network would be rounded up and shut down. Ditto for the training camps that educate terrorist wannabes for jihad against Western democracies. Within a year, cybercafes catering to backpacking college kids would spring up across Kabul. Unfortunately, it won't make any difference. Most of the training camps for such radical guerrilla outfits as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which made a name for itself a few years back with its annual raids on southern Kyrgyzstan, are in Pakistan, Tajikistan and southern Kyrgyzstan. The Tajik and Kyrgyz governments are far too impoverished, politically weak and poorly armed to eject these insurgents, but both value their ten-year-old independence from the Soviet Union too much to allow foreign troops into their territory to do the job. Madrassas (religious schools) in the Baluchistan and Northwest Frontier Provinces of Pakistan continue to serve up Jihad 101, but the fragile military government of General Pervez Musharraf, ethnically aligned and beholden to the Taliban for battling the Indians in disputed Kashmir province, will never risk the wrath of Muslim extremists in their own country by shutting them down. Bottom line: bombing, destroying and militarily-occupying Afghanistan only shuts down a small fraction of the terrorist training facilities. Now, let's escalate from the madness of an Afghan invasion (remember how well the same idea worked out for Britain and the USSR?) to full-fledged mayhem on a monumental scale. Assuming that we get the approval-and still better, military backing-of Russia's Vladimir Putin, U.S. troops could fan out across Central Asia. Tajikistan would come easy. Kyrgyzstan wouldn't require much effort. Pakistan is a nuclear state nowadays; perhaps we could pay them to close the madrassas . It still wouldn't make much difference. Tens of thousands of Arab fundamentalist militants have already graduated from those Taliban-affiliated training facilities. They're in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Libya, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Syria ... and Florida. They belong to dozens of distinct organizations, each enjoying individual sources of financing and adhering to separate goals and ideologies. Putting their alma maters out of business won't prevent them from carrying out future attacks on the U.S. Nonetheless, it's always possible to carry a hypothetical war on terrorism to its logical extreme: somehow, perhaps using satellite surveillance and pixie dust, the U.S. and its allies successfully hunt down every single member of every militant Islamic organization in the world and either jail or kill them. Who knows how? Anyway- It still wouldn't matter. Those dead and jailed militants have mothers, fathers, sisters and brothers. They have friends. And countless ordinary Muslim people would watch, driven to vengeance by the extraordinary ruthlessness of such a massive assault by America on individuals whose only proven sins are their beliefs. A new army of jihadists would rise from the ashes of Bush's 21st century crusade. Nonetheless, America must have its vengeance. We're not the kind of people to sit around and mourn a few thousand dead office workers when there's some serious ass to kick. So we'll bomb or invade or something. It won't matter, but that doesn't matter. It's what we do. Chapter Two The New Great Game NEW YORK, October 9 Nursultan Nazarbayev has a terrible problem. He's the president and former Communist Party boss of Kazakhstan, the second-largest republic of the former Soviet Union. A few years ago, the giant country struck oil in the eastern portion of the Caspian Sea. Geologists estimate that sitting beneath the wind-blown steppes of Kazakhstan are 50 billion barrels of off-by far the biggest untapped reserves in the world. (Saudi Arabia, currently the world's largest oil producer, is believed to have about 30 billion barrels remaining. Kazakhstan, meanwhile, may have unconfirmed reserves of up to 260 billion barrels.) Kazakhstan's Soviet-subsidized economy collapsed immediately after independence in 1991. When I visited the then-capital of Almaty in 1997. I was struck by its utter absence of elderly people. One after another, Kazakhs confided that their parents had died of malnutrition during the brutal winters of 1993 and 1994. Middle-class residents of a superpower had been reduced to abject poverty virtually overnight; thirtysomething women who appeared sixtysomething hocked their wedding silver in underpasses next to reps for the Kazakh state art museum trying to move enough socialist realist paintings for a dollar each to keep the lights on. The average Kazakh earned $20 a month; those unwilling or unable to steal died of gangrene adjacent to long-winded tales of woe written on cardboard. Autocrats tend to die badly during periods of downward mobility. Nazarbayev, therefore, has spent most of the last decade trying to get his land-locked oil out to sea. Once the oil starts flowing, it won't take long before Kazakhstan replaces Kuwait as the land of Benzes and ugly gold jewelry. But the longer the pipeline, the more expensive and vulnerable to sabotage it is. The shortest route runs through Iran but Kazakhstan is too closely aligned with the U.S. to offend it by cutting a deal with Teheran. Russia has helpfully offered to build a line connecting Kazakh oil rigs to the Black Sea, but neighboring Turkmenistan has experienced trouble with the Russians-they tend to divert the oil for their own uses without bothering to pay for it. There's even a plan to run crude out to the Pacific through China, but the proposed 5,300-mile line would be far too long to prove profitable. The logical alternative, then, is Unocal's plan, which is to extend Turkmenistan's existing system west to the Kazakh field on the Caspian and southeast to the Pakistani port of Karachi on the Arabian Sea. That project runs through Afghanistan. As Central Asian expert Ahmed Rashid describes in his 2000 book "Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia," the U.S. and Pakistan decided to install a stable regime into place in Afghanistan around 1994-a regime that would end the country's civil war and thus ensure the safety of the Unocal pipeline project. Impressed by the ruthlessness and willingness of the then-emerging Taliban to cut a pipeline deal, the U.S. State Department and Pakistan's Interservices Intelligence (I.S.I.) agency agreed to funnel arms and funding to the Taliban in their war against the ethnically Tajik Northern Alliance. As recently as 1999, U.S. taxpayers paid the entire annual salary of every single Taliban government official, all in the hopes of returning to the days of dollar-a-gallon gas. Pakistan, naturally, would pick up revenues from a Karachi oil port facility. Harkening to 19th century power politics between Russia and British India, Rashid dubbed the struggle for control of post-Soviet Central Asia "the new Great Game." Predictably, the Taliban Frankenstein got out of control. The regime's unholy alliance with Osama bin Laden's terror network, their penchant for invading their neighbors and their production of 50 percent of the world's opium made them unlikely partners for the desired oil deal. Then-President Bill Clinton's 1998 cruise missile attack on Afghanistan briefly brought the Taliban back into line-they even eradicated opium poppy cultivation in less than a year-but they nonetheless continued supporting countless militant Islamic groups. When a group whose members had trained in Afghanistan hijacked four airplanes and used them to kill more than 3,000 Americans on September 11th, Washington's patience with its former client finally expired. Finally, the Bushies had the perfect excuse to do what the U.S. had wanted all along-invade and/or install an old-school puppet regime in Kabul. Realpolitik no more cares about the 3,000 dead than it concerns itself with oppressed women in Afghanistan; this ersatz war by a phony president is solely about getting an oil pipeline deal done without interference from annoying local middlemen. Central Asian politics, however, is a house of cards: every time you remove one element, the whole thing comes crashing down. Muslim extremists in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, for instance, will support additional terror attacks on the U.S. to avenge the elimination of the Taliban. A U.S.-installed Northern Alliance can't hold Kabul without an army of occupation because Afghan legitimacy hinges on capturing the capital on your own. And even if we do this the right way by funding and training the Northern Alliance so that they can seize power themselves, Pakistan's ethnic Pashtun government won't long stand the replacement of their Pashtun brothers in the Taliban by Northern Alliance Tajiks. Without Pakistani cooperation, there's no getting the oil out and there's no chance for long-term stability in Afghanistan. As Bush would say, make no mistake: this is about oil. It's always about oil. And to twist a late `90s cliché, it's only boring because it's true. Excerpted from TO AFGHANISTAN AND BACK by Ted Rall Excerpted by permission. All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.

Table of Contents

Bill Maher
Introductionp. 7
Forewordp. 9
1. Giving War A Chancep. 11
2. The New Great Gamep. 15
3. Nineteen Guys Who Shook The Worldp. 19
4. Capitalism Comes To Central Asiap. 23
5. Death And Boredom On The Front Linep. 27
6. All Things Fall Apartp. 31
Graphic Travelogue
1. This Ain't No Gamep. 35
2. Commuter Warp. 51
3. Night Of The Huntersp. 73
7. Taliban Family Valuesp. 85
8. Running The Odds When Nobody Caresp. 91
9. Here's To The Middle Agesp. 95
10. When Life Is A Short-Term Leasep. 97
11. A Snake Swallowing A Snake Swallowing Its Tailp. 101
12. How We Lost The Afghan Warp. 105
Recommended Readingp. 111