Cover image for Learning lessons from Waco : when the parties bring their Gods to the negotiation table
Title:
Learning lessons from Waco : when the parties bring their Gods to the negotiation table
Author:
Docherty, Jayne Seminare.
Personal Author:
Edition:
lst edition.
Publication Information:
Syracuse, N.Y. : Syracuse University Press, [2001]

©2001
Physical Description:
xviii, 351 pages : illustrations ; 23 cm.
Language:
English
Corporate Subject:
ISBN:
9780815627517

9780815627760
Format :
Book

Available:*

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Call Number
Material Type
Home Location
Status
Central Library BP605.B72 D63 2001 Adult Non-Fiction Central Closed Stacks
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Summary

Summary

This intensive case study derives lessons for negotiation theory, research, and practice from the Waco disaster. The siege at Waco simply refuses to disappear. Recently uncovered evidence, an ongoing civil suit, and the Danforth investigation fuel public interest and controversy. Heated debates about what really happened in Waco are a recurring public drama. Yet, little or no attention has been given to the work of the negotiator who talked with the Branch Davidians. This important book utilizes largely unexplored sources of data to explain why fifty-one days of negotiations by federal officials failed to get Branch Davidians to exit the compound, as desired. Learning Lessons from Waco applies a theory of worldview conflict to the more than 12,000 pages of negotiation transcripts from Waco. Through perceptive analysis of the situation, Jayne Seminare Docherty offers a fresh perspective on the activities of law enforcement agents. She shows how the Waco conflict resulted from a collision of two distinct worldviews - the FBI's and the Davidians' - and their divergent notions of reality. By exploring the failures of the negotiations, she also urges a better understanding of encounte


Summary

This intensive case study derives lessons for negotiation theory, research, and practice from the Waco disaster. The siege at Waco simply refuses to disappear. Recently uncovered evidence, an ongoing civil suit, and the Danforth investigation fuel public interest and controversy. Heated debates about what really happened in Waco are a recurring public drama. Yet, little or no attention has been given to the work of the negotiator who talked with the Branch Davidians. This important book utilizes largely unexplored sources of data to explain why fifty-one days of negotiations by federal officials failed to get Branch Davidians to exit the compound, as desired. Learning Lessons from Waco applies a theory of worldview conflict to the more than 12,000 pages of negotiation transcripts from Waco. Through perceptive analysis of the situation, Jayne Seminare Docherty offers a fresh perspective on the activities of law enforcement agents. She shows how the Waco conflict resulted from a collision of two distinct worldviews - the FBI's and the Davidians' - and their divergent notions of reality. By exploring the failures of the negotiations, she also urges a better understanding of encounte


Reviews 4

Library Journal Review

Docherty (conflict studies, Eastern Mennonite Univ.) presents a conceptual model of worldview conflict, using the example of Waco to extract principles for negotiating with communities motivated by unconventional beliefs. Having researched transcripts of the negotiation tapes, official reports of events surrounding the negotiation, and interviews, she argues that parties with fundamentally different worldviews must first deal with reality, or "worldnaming," before they can begin to confront the issues. Docherty suggests that because they used different "naming, framing, and blaming" language, the two sides in the Waco negotiation were destined to fail. While the Branch Davidians' reality was based on values and spirituality, that of the FBI was scientific and goal-centered, and it dismissed the Davidians' attempts to communicate as "Bible babble." Docherty concludes with 14 lessons for future crisis negotiators dealing with such groups, not the least of which is that they must know their own worldview and work to understand that of the parties with whom they are negotiating. This book is doctoral candidate Docherty's thesis, as reflected in the hundreds of citations, footnotes, and discussions of other theoretical approaches. While the thesis is important and timely, the language is sometimes so academic that it may not be every negotiator's next read. For academic libraries. Julie Denny, Resolutions, Inc., Armenia, NY (c) Copyright 2010. Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.


Choice Review

This important contribution to the literature on conflict analysis and resolution, a detailed case study of botched FBI-Branch Davidian negotiations at Waco, makes the significant point that negotiators need to take into consideration "worldviewing" or "worldnaming." A community's worldview shapes the way it frames an issue and determines the meaning it assigns to words and concepts. Docherty (Eastern Mennonite Univ.) persuasively argues that "The parties were driven farther and farther apart by their inability to, first, adequately comprehend the worldview of the other and, second, create conceptual linkages with which to craft mutually satisfactory resolution to their immediate crisis." When the parties in a conflict do not share the same worldview, rational bargaining on the basis of interests and needs will not be effective. The FBI and the Branch Davidians had radically different worldviews; thus they continually talked past each other. The government negotiators, in particular, never grasped the Branch Davidian worldmaking narrative, nor was the FBI team able to be self-critical of the different worldview they brought to the conversation. Tragedy ensued. Docherty's insights might have particular relevance in the post-September 11 world. This book should be required reading for government crisis negotiators and will be of interest to anyone involved in conflict resolution. General readers; graduate level. J. M. Thompson Bellarmine University


Library Journal Review

Docherty (conflict studies, Eastern Mennonite Univ.) presents a conceptual model of worldview conflict, using the example of Waco to extract principles for negotiating with communities motivated by unconventional beliefs. Having researched transcripts of the negotiation tapes, official reports of events surrounding the negotiation, and interviews, she argues that parties with fundamentally different worldviews must first deal with reality, or "worldnaming," before they can begin to confront the issues. Docherty suggests that because they used different "naming, framing, and blaming" language, the two sides in the Waco negotiation were destined to fail. While the Branch Davidians' reality was based on values and spirituality, that of the FBI was scientific and goal-centered, and it dismissed the Davidians' attempts to communicate as "Bible babble." Docherty concludes with 14 lessons for future crisis negotiators dealing with such groups, not the least of which is that they must know their own worldview and work to understand that of the parties with whom they are negotiating. This book is doctoral candidate Docherty's thesis, as reflected in the hundreds of citations, footnotes, and discussions of other theoretical approaches. While the thesis is important and timely, the language is sometimes so academic that it may not be every negotiator's next read. For academic libraries. Julie Denny, Resolutions, Inc., Armenia, NY (c) Copyright 2010. Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.


Choice Review

This important contribution to the literature on conflict analysis and resolution, a detailed case study of botched FBI-Branch Davidian negotiations at Waco, makes the significant point that negotiators need to take into consideration "worldviewing" or "worldnaming." A community's worldview shapes the way it frames an issue and determines the meaning it assigns to words and concepts. Docherty (Eastern Mennonite Univ.) persuasively argues that "The parties were driven farther and farther apart by their inability to, first, adequately comprehend the worldview of the other and, second, create conceptual linkages with which to craft mutually satisfactory resolution to their immediate crisis." When the parties in a conflict do not share the same worldview, rational bargaining on the basis of interests and needs will not be effective. The FBI and the Branch Davidians had radically different worldviews; thus they continually talked past each other. The government negotiators, in particular, never grasped the Branch Davidian worldmaking narrative, nor was the FBI team able to be self-critical of the different worldview they brought to the conversation. Tragedy ensued. Docherty's insights might have particular relevance in the post-September 11 world. This book should be required reading for government crisis negotiators and will be of interest to anyone involved in conflict resolution. General readers; graduate level. J. M. Thompson Bellarmine University


Table of Contents

Kevin AvruchKevin Avruch
Illustrationsp. ix
Forewordp. xi
Acknowledgmentsp. xv
Abbreviationsp. xvii
Introduction: The Never-Ending Drama of Wacop. 1
1. What Really Happened in Waco in 1993?p. 18
2. Understanding Worldview Conflictsp. 49
3. When Worlds Collidep. 69
4. Managing a Crisis Between "Citizens of Separate Worlds"p. 103
5. Establishing Relationships Across a Worldview Dividep. 124
6. "If You Release Some of Those Youngsters ... We Will Play the Tape"p. 154
7. "We Don't Want Anything from Your Country"p. 189
8. When the Parties Bring Their Gods to the Tablep. 225
9. Working with Worldview Conflictsp. 274
Appendixes
Appendix A. The Special Counsel's Summary of the Waco Negotiationsp. 313
Appendix B. Defining the Coding Categoriesp. 315
Referencesp. 319
Indexp. 339
Illustrationsp. ix
Forewordp. xi
Acknowledgmentsp. xv
Abbreviationsp. xvii
Introduction: The Never-Ending Drama of Wacop. 1
1. What Really Happened in Waco in 1993?p. 18
2. Understanding Worldview Conflictsp. 49
3. When Worlds Collidep. 69
4. Managing a Crisis Between "Citizens of Separate Worlds"p. 103
5. Establishing Relationships Across a Worldview Dividep. 124
6. "If You Release Some of Those Youngsters ... We Will Play the Tape"p. 154
7. "We Don't Want Anything from Your Country"p. 189
8. When the Parties Bring Their Gods to the Tablep. 225
9. Working with Worldview Conflictsp. 274
Appendixes
Appendix A. The Special Counsel's Summary of the Waco Negotiationsp. 313
Appendix B. Defining the Coding Categoriesp. 315
Referencesp. 319
Indexp. 339

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