Cover image for Measuring interdiction capabilities in the presence of anti-access strategies : exploratory analysis to inform adaptive strategy for the Persian Gulf
Title:
Measuring interdiction capabilities in the presence of anti-access strategies : exploratory analysis to inform adaptive strategy for the Persian Gulf
Author:
Davis, Paul K., 1943-
Personal Author:
Publication Information:
Santa Monica, CA : Rand, 2002.
Physical Description:
xxvii, 189 pages : illustrations, map ; 28 cm.
General Note:
"Prepared for the United States Air Force."

"MR-1471-AF"--P. [4] of cover.
Language:
English
Added Corporate Author:
ISBN:
9780833031075
Format :
Book

Available:*

Library
Call Number
Material Type
Home Location
Status
Central Library UA23 .D288 2002 Adult Non-Fiction Central Closed Stacks-Oversize
Searching...

On Order

Summary

Summary

This book discusses how U.S. capabilities for interdicting invading ground forces in the Persian Gulf can be adapted over time to maintain the ability to achieve an early halt or to counter maneuver forces in other plausible campaigns. The authors emphasize exploratory analysis under massive uncertainty about political and military developments and about the detailed circumstances of conflict. The book documents a specialized model used for mission system analysis, which helps identify critical enablers of early-halt capability: deployment; immediate command-control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; ability to employ interdiction forces quickly; and weapon effectiveness. The United States should expect threatened or actual use of mass-casualty weapons against its forces and regional allies and enemy attempts to act quickly and with short warning. On the other hand, the threat's size and quality may be less than usually assumed. On the military side, the book characterizes parametrically the conditions for a successful early halt, thereby identifying high-priority strategic hedges, capability developments, and potential adaptations. The book considers joint forces for interdiction and synergy with rapidly employable ground forces. On the political side, the book notes the premium on continued forward basing, aggressive use of ambiguous warning, and long-range bombers. Continued enforcement of red-line constructs could greatly improve the likelihood of decisive response to ambiguous warning. Countering anti-access strategies would be enhanced by negotiating use of more distant bases and logistic preparation. It will be increasingly unwise to assume use of forward bases, even if technical analysis suggests that the bases could operate under attacks with mass-casualty weapons.


Excerpts

Excerpts

Analytical methods for capabilities-based planning of interdiction missions and models to implement the methods. Excerpted from Measuring Interdiction Capabilities in the Presence of Anti-Access Strategies: Exploratory Analysis to Inform Adaptive Strategy for the Persian Gulf by Paul K. Davis, Jimmie McEver, Barry A. Wilson All rights reserved by the original copyright owners. Excerpts are provided for display purposes only and may not be reproduced, reprinted or distributed without the written permission of the publisher.

Table of Contents

Prefacep. iii
Figuresp. ix
Tablesp. xi
Summaryp. xiii
Acknowledgmentsp. xxv
Acronymsp. xxvii
1. Introductionp. 1
1.1. Background and Objectivesp. 1
The Early-Halt Problemp. 1
The Halt Problem as a Measure of More General Counter-Maneuver Capabilityp. 1
Monograph's Objectivesp. 2
1.2. Approach: Use of Closed-Form Analytical Modelsp. 2
1.3. Structure of Monographp. 4
2. Overview of the Halt Problemp. 7
2.1. Generic Geographyp. 7
2.2. The Forcesp. 7
2.3. Bases: Access and Vulnerabilityp. 9
2.4. The Concept of Red Linesp. 9
Significance of the Red Line Conceptp. 9
Cautionsp. 10
2.5. Defense Lines and Ground Forcesp. 10
3. Analytics of the Elementary Halt Problemp. 13
3.1. Viewing the Problem as a Racep. 13
Blue's Employment Strategy and the Attacker's Resulting Movement Rate and Penetrationp. 14
The Concept of Equivalent Shootersp. 18
Buildup of Shooters: Effects of Warning, Decision, and Accessp. 19
Solving for the Number of D-Day Shooters, A[subscript 0]p. 21
Shooters Versus Time After D-Day: Average Deployment Ratep. 23
Shooter Effectivenessp. 23
3.2. Solving the Halt Problem for Interdiction In Depth (No Capacity Limits)p. 25
Basic Features of Solutionp. 25
Limiting Formsp. 27
3.3. Solving the Halt Problem for Leading-Edge Interdiction (No Capacity Limits)p. 29
Solution Based on Slowing Effect Alonep. 29
Combined Solutions and Optimal Strategiesp. 33
Implementation Notesp. 35
3.4. Significance of Delay Time (No Capacity Limits)p. 36
3.5. Effects of Access Constraints and Maximum Theater Capacityp. 36
Interdiction In Depth with a Theater Capacityp. 37
Leading-Edge Interdiction with Theater Capacityp. 39
Effects of a Theater Capacity Constraintp. 40
3.6. Indirect Effects of Mass-Destruction Weaponsp. 41
3.7. Summary Insightsp. 42
4. Losses to Air Defense and Tradeoffs Between Losses and Halt Timep. 45
4.1. Solutions for In-Depth Interdiction (Ignoring Losses)p. 45
Basic Analyticsp. 45
An Illustrative Casep. 47
A Second Illustrative Casep. 48
Solutions Covering All Time Orderingsp. 49
4.2. Solutions for the Leading-Edge Strategy (Ignoring Losses)p. 52
General Commentsp. 52
Halt Distancep. 56
4.3. Solutions That Include Losses to Air Defensesp. 56
General Commentsp. 56
Effects on the Time Maximum Theater Capacity Is Reachedp. 58
In-Depth and Leading-Edge Interdiction with Lossesp. 59
Results for an Optimum Strategyp. 60
4.4. Optimizing the Wait Timep. 60
Implementationp. 62
4.5. Summary Insightsp. 62
5. Ground Forces at A Defense Linep. 67
5.1. Overviewp. 67
5.2. Ground Forces as a Small Source of Daily Attrition and Disruptionp. 67
5.3. Ground Forces at a Defense Linep. 67
Motivations and Concernsp. 67
A Modularization That More Fully Respects the Subtleties of Close Combatp. 68
The Mathematics of the Defense-Line Calculationsp. 69
Solutionsp. 70
6. Factors Reflecting Weapons Supply, C[superscript 2], C[superscript 4]isr, Terrain, and Enemy Maneuver Tacticsp. 73
6.1. Representing Limited Supplies of Best Weaponsp. 73
Calculating Exhaustion Timep. 73
Treating Exhaustion Time T[subscript exh] as an Exogenous Inputp. 74
6.2. Calculating Halt Time and Halt Distance with Limited Best Weaponsp. 74
An Approximation to Reduce Dimensionalityp. 74
Identifying the "Chunks": The Cases for Which Separate Formulas Are Neededp. 75
Solutions for the In-Depth Strategyp. 75
Solutions for the Slowing Effect of the Leading-Edge Strategyp. 81
6.3. Reflecting Command and Control and Other Effects, Such as Those of Terrain and Maneuver Tacticsp. 82
Command-Control Gain-Competence Timep. 82
Problems with Early C[superscript 4]ISRp. 84
Reflecting Early C[superscript 2] and ISR Problemsp. 84
Effects of C[superscript 2], ISR, Terrain, and Maneuver Tactics on Shooter Effectivenessp. 84
7. Dealing with Risk and Uncertaintyp. 87
7.1. Purpose of Chapterp. 87
7.2. Risk and Uncertainty for the Early-Halt Problemp. 87
Reviewing the Significance of Early-Halt Capabilityp. 87
Source of Risk (Factors Reducing the Probability of an Early Halt)p. 88
The Upside of Uncertaintyp. 88
Types of Riskp. 89
7.3. Structuring Uncertainty Analysis: the Concept of a Scenario Space (or Assumptions Space)p. 90
7.4. Enabling Scenario-Space Analysis with a Multiresolution Modelp. 92
MRMPM Depictionp. 92
The Composite Model and Simplificationsp. 93
7.5. Illustrative Scenario Spaces and Experimental Plansp. 96
Parametric Explorationp. 97
Displaying Results of Parametric Explorationp. 100
Stochastic Features and Probabilistic Explorationp. 105
7.6. Interface Models for Dealing with Cross-Cutting Factors Such as C[superscript 4]ISR in Exploratory Analysisp. 111
Using Interface Models for Gamingp. 114
8. Illustrative Analysis Toward Adaptive Strategyp. 117
8.1. Introductionp. 117
8.2. Taking a Mission-System Perspectivep. 117
Basic Conceptsp. 117
An Example of Mission-System Analysisp. 119
A Requirements Diagramp. 122
Summary on Mission-System Viewp. 123
8.3. Selected Observations from Analysisp. 123
Preventing a Quick Takeoverp. 123
Movement Ratesp. 123
D-Day Shootersp. 125
Protracted SEAD, Delays in C[superscript 4]ISR, and Staged Operationsp. 126
Shooter Effectivenessp. 126
Number of Top-Quality Munitionsp. 127
Losses to Air Defensesp. 128
Deployment Ratesp. 129
Anti-Access Problems and Weapons of Mass Destructionp. 129
Effects of Delayed Access to Regional Basesp. 132
Slowing Movement: Effects of Force Employment Strategyp. 132
Slowing and Confronting: Immediate Air Strikes and the Potential Use of Early Arriving Ground Forcesp. 136
Improving Anti-Armor Operations Before SEAD Is Complete: The Value of Partial Stealthp. 136
Effects of Probabilistic Calculationsp. 138
8.4. Summary Results of Exploratory Analysisp. 140
8.5. Possible Adaptations to Improve Outcomesp. 140
Appendix
A. Representing Different Shooter Typesp. 147
B. Summary of Variables Used in Modelsp. 151
C. Summary Description of Exhalt 1.5p. 157
D. An Approximation for Cases in Which T[subscript exh] Occurs Before T[subscript wait]p. 161
E. General Formulas for Leading-Edge Strategyp. 163
F. Notes on Implementation in Analyticap. 179
Bibliographyp. 185

Google Preview