Cover image for Caging the genies : a workable solution for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons
Title:
Caging the genies : a workable solution for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons
Author:
Turner, Stansfield, 1923-
Personal Author:
Edition:
[Second edition].
Publication Information:
Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press, 1999.
Physical Description:
xvi, 189 pages : illustrations ; 23 cm
General Note:
Edition statement from p. xi.

Rev. ed. of: Caging the nuclear genie.
Language:
English
Reading Level:
1320 Lexile.
ISBN:
9780813366777
Format :
Book

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Material Type
Home Location
Status
Central Library U793 .T87 1999 Adult Non-Fiction Central Closed Stacks
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Summary

Summary

The Cold War may be over, but you wouldn't know it from the tens of thousands of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of mass destruction still held by Russia, the United States, and other world powers. Arguing that the time has come to dispense with incremental approaches to arms control, Admiral Stansfield Turner, the former head of the CIA and an experienced senior military commander, proposes a practical yet safe plan--strategic escrow--that would move the world into a new and secure millennium. The paperback edition of this widely acclaimed work has been updated to consider the implications of such a build-down if applied to non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction. Specifically, Admiral Turner details how a plan for weapons reduction could be carried out for biological and chemical weapons and what tactical and strategic differences exist between de-escalation of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons.


Author Notes

Stansfield Turner is the former head of the CIA and an experienced senior military commander. He is the author of Secrecy and Democracy and Terrorism and Democracy.


Table of Contents

Acknowledgmentsp. xi
Acronymsp. xv
Introductionp. 1
Part 1 The Problem
1 The Spell Cast by Weapons of Mass Destructionp. 7
Part 2 The Theory
2 Points of Non-recoveryp. 31
3 Points of Self-Deterrencep. 51
4 Controlled Responsep. 65
Part 3 The Solution
5 Strategic Escrowp. 81
6 No First-Usep. 89
7 Defensesp. 95
8 Global Managementp. 113
9 Reshaping Decisionmakingp. 131
10 The Sine Qua Non--Citizen Supportp. 141
Appendix A Lethality of Nuclear Weaponsp. 149
Appendix B Excerpts from "Nuclear Crash--The U.S. Economy After Small Nuclear Attacks," M. Anjali Sastry, Joseph J. Romm, and Kosta Tsipisp. 159
Appendix C Calculation of Russian Forces Surviving a U.S. Preemptive Attackp. 169
Notesp. 175
Indexp. 181

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