Cover image for Banking panics of the Gilded Age
Title:
Banking panics of the Gilded Age
Author:
Wicker, Elmus.
Personal Author:
Publication Information:
Cambridge, UK New York : Cambridge University Press, [2000]

©2000
Physical Description:
xvii, 160 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm
Language:
English
Contents:
The bank panic experience: an overview -- The banking panic of 1873 -- Two incipient banking panics of 1884 and 1890: an unheralded success story --- The banking panic of 1893 -- The Trust Company panic of 1907 -- Were panics of the national banking era preventable?.
ISBN:
9780521770231
Format :
Book

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Library
Call Number
Material Type
Home Location
Status
Central Library HG2477 .W53 2000 Adult Non-Fiction Non-Fiction Area
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Summary

Summary

This was the first major study of post-Civil War banking panics in almost a century. The author has constructed estimates of bank closures and their incidence in each of the five separate banking disturbances. The book takes a novel approach by reconstructing the course of banking panics in the interior, where suspension of cash payment, not bank closures, was the primary effect of banking panics on the average person. The author also re-evaluates the role of the New York Clearing House in forestalling several panics and explains why it failed to do so in 1893 and 1907, concluding that structural defects of the National Banking Act were not the primary cause of the panics.


Reviews 1

Choice Review

Wicker (emer., Indiana Univ., Bloomington) offers a careful examination of the five banking panics that occurred in the US between 1873 and 1907. Conventional wisdom attributed these panics to structural weaknesses in the national banking system exacerbated by seasonal money flows between New York banks and other regions. Using revised estimates on bank and cash payment suspensions, the author shows the primary cause to be the institutional failure of potentially effective existing monetary practices. Since a handful of large New York banks held the ultimate bank reserves of the country, proper management of these reserves could mitigate a panic's severity. During the panics of 1873, 1884, and 1890, the New York Clearing House (NYCH)--a private association--did stabilize money markets by redistributing cash reserves among member banks and issuing loan certificates enabling banks to expand loans and provide liquidity. But, during the panics of 1893 and 1907, the NYCH's "central bank" functions were employed ineffectively. For example, Wicker discusses how the severity of the panic was increased in 1907 by the reluctance of NYCH members to support troubled nonmember trust companies and by J.P. Morgan's adoption of the less efficient "money pool" rather than the NYCH loan certificate. Recommended for collections serving upper-division undergraduate students through faculty. F. Petrella; emeritus, College of the Holy Cross


Table of Contents

1 The bank panic experience: an overview
2 The banking panic of 1873
3 Two incipient banking panics of 1884 and 1890: an unheralded success story
4 The banking panic of 1893
5 The trust company panic of 1907
6 Were panics of the national banking era preventable?
7 Epilogue

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