Cover image for Condemned to repetition? : the rise, fall, and reprise of Soviet-Russian military interventionism, 1973-1996
Condemned to repetition? : the rise, fall, and reprise of Soviet-Russian military interventionism, 1973-1996
Bennett, Andrew.
Personal Author:
Publication Information:
Cambridge, Mass : The MIT Press, [1999]

Physical Description:
xi, 387 pages ; 24 cm.
Introduction -- Alternative explanations for the rise, fall, and reprise of Soviet-Russian military interventionism -- Learning theory and the Soviet and Russian systems -- Soviet military intervention in Angola, 1975 -- Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, 1979 -- Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, 1980-84 -- Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, 1989 -- From Soviet withdrawal to Russian intervention, 1989-96 -- Conclusion -- Index -- About the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.

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UA770 .B435 1999 Adult Non-Fiction Central Closed Stacks

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Why did the Soviet Union use less force to preserve the Soviet empire from 1989 to 1991 than it had used in distant and impoverished Angola in 1975? This book examines how actors' preferences and causal conceptions change as they learn from their experiences.

Author Notes

Andrew Bennett is Assistant Professor of Government at Georgetown University.

Reviews 1

Choice Review

This book offers a detailed empirical study of patterns of Soviet and Russian military interventionism, describing its rise in the 1970s, its fall in the 1980s, and its revival in the 1990s. Extensive case studies of Soviet military intervention in Angola and Afghanistan, and more limited studies of Russian military intervention in former Soviet states (Moldova, Georgia, and Tajikistan) and within Russian Federation territories (North Ossetia, Ingushetia, and Chechyna) provide the basis of the study. The case studies explore the utility of "learning theory," to explain state behavior. Learning theory anticipates cyclical swings in policy as new experiences, lessons, and leaders replace older ones. The cases document a high level of consistency between stated beliefs of leaders on military intervention and decisions to intervene. Bennett further concludes that these patterns can be explained by a learning process in which individuals, organizations, and governments change their cognitive structures in response to experiences. The manuscript was completed before the second Russian military intervention in Chechnya, an exercise which to this point has been characterized by a change in military tactics and in the management of news about the war. One wonders about the utility of Bennett's approach in explaining this second phase of the Chechnya war. Upper-division undergraduates, graduate students, and faculty. D. V. Schwartz; University of Toronto

Table of Contents

Prefacep. vii
Chapter 1 Introductionp. 1
Chapter 2 Alternative Explanations for the Rise, Fall, and Reprise of Soviet-Russian Military Interventionismp. 39
Chapter 3 Learning Theory and the Soviet and Russian Systemsp. 75
Chapter 4 Soviet Military Intervention in Angola, 1975p. 127
Chapter 5 Soviet Military Intervention in Afghanistan, 1979p. 167
Chapter 6 Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan, 1980-84p. 215
Chapter 7 Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan, 1989p. 247
Chapter 8 From Soviet Withdrawal to Russian Intervention, 1989-96p. 295
Chapter 9 Conclusionp. 349
Indexp. 371
About the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairsp. 388