Cover image for National insecurity : U.S. intelligence after the Cold War
National insecurity : U.S. intelligence after the Cold War
Eisendrath, Craig R.
Publication Information:
Philadelphia : Temple University Press, [2000]

Physical Description:
viii, 241 pages ; 23 cm
General Note:
"A project of the Center for International Policy."
After the Cold War: the need for intelligence / Roger Hilsman -- Espionage and covert action / Melvin A. Goodman -- Too many spies, too little intelligence / Robert E. White -- CIA-foreign service relations / Robert V. Keeley -- Covert operations: the blowback problem / Jack A. Blum -- The end of secrecy: US national security and the new openness movement / Kate Doyle -- Mission myopia: narcotics as fallout from the CIA's covert wars / Alfred W. McCoy -- Techint: the NSA, the NRO, and NIMA / Robert Dreyfuss -- Improving the output of intelligence: priorities, managerial changes, and funding / Richard A. Stubbing -- Who's watching the store? Executive-branch and congressional surveillance / Pat M. Holt.
Added Author:

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Item Holds
UB251.U5 N38 2000 Adult Non-Fiction Central Closed Stacks

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A drastic reform of intelligence activities is long overdue. The Cold War has been over for ten years. No country threatens this nation's existence. Yet, we still spend billions of dollars on covert action and espionage. In National Insecurity ten prominent experts describe, from an insider's perspective, what went wrong with U.S. intelligence and what will be necessary to fix it. Drawing on their experience in government administration, research, and foreign service, they propose a radical rethinking of the United States' intelligence needs in the post-Cold War world. In addition, they offer a coherent and unified plan for reform that can simultaneously protect U.S. security and uphold the values of our democratic system. As we now know, even during the Cold War, when intelligence was seen as a matter of life and death, our system served us badly. It provided unreliable information, which led to a grossly inflated military budget, as it wreaked havoc around the world, supporting corrupt regimes, promoting the drug trade, and repeatedly violating foreign and domestic laws. Protected by a shroud of secrecy, it paid no price for its mistakes. Instead it grew larger and more insulated every year. Taking into consideration our strategic interests abroad as well as the price of covert operations in dollars, reliability, and good will, every American taxpayer can be informed by and will want to read this book. National Insecurity is essential for readers interested in contemporary political issues, international relations, U.S. history, public policy issues, foreign policy, intelligence reform, and political science.

Author Notes

Craig Eisendrath is Senior Fellow at the Center for International Policy in Washington, D.C. He served as a U.S. Foreign Officer.

Reviews 1

Choice Review

Since the end of the Cold War and collapse of the "Evil Empire," the chorus of critics of the US intelligence community has grown significantly. A permanent intelligence establishment was accepted as necessary only to confront the communist menace. The costs--to the US treasury, US security, US image, and US values--became prohibitive as soon as that menace evaporated. Washington authorized two reports, one by a joint executive branch/congressional commission, the other by the House Intelligence Committee, to assess the state of US intelligence, but neither recommended substantive reforms. Consequently, the Center for International Policy, a liberal think tank, took its case to the public with this volume written largely by former government intelligence officials. The diagnoses and prescriptions are predictable. American intelligence efforts historically did more harm than good, and the present era provides a golden opportunity for radical surgery. The need for intelligence collection remains, but targets should be limited and precise. The US should rely almost exclusively on technical intelligence and the reports of foreign-service officers (not spies), covert operations should be abandoned, and the intelligence budget should be reduced by approximately 5 percent. The recommendations, while useful, add almost nothing new to the national debate. Contributions by additional scholars would have been more valuable for this purpose. All levels. R. H. Immerman; Temple University

Table of Contents

Senator Tom HarkinCraig EisendrathRoger HilsmanMelvin A. GoodmanRobert E. WhiteRobert V. KeeleyJack A. BlumKate DoyleAlfred W. McCoyRobert DreyfussRichard A. StubbingPat M. HoltCraig Eisendrath
Forewordp. vii
Introductionp. 1
1 After the Cold War: The Need for Intelligencep. 8
2 Espionage and Covert Actionp. 23
3 Too Many Spies, Too Little Intelligencep. 45
4 CIA-Foreign Service Relationsp. 61
5 Covert Operations: The Blowback Problemp. 76
6 The End of Secrecy: U.S. National Security and the New Openness Movementp. 92
7 Mission Myopia: Narcotics as Fallout From the CIA's Covert Warsp. 118
8 Techint: The NSA, the NRO, and NIMAp. 149
9 Improving the Output of Intelligence: Priorities, Managerial Changes, and Fundingp. 172
10 Who's Watching the Store? Executive-Branch and Congressional Surveillancep. 190
Conclusionsp. 212
Selected Bibliographyp. 223
About The Center for International Policyp. 227
About the Contributorsp. 231
Indexp. 233