Cover image for From Yalta to Berlin : the Cold War struggle over Germany
From Yalta to Berlin : the Cold War struggle over Germany
Smyser, W. R., 1931-
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First edition.
Publication Information:
New York : St. Martin's Press, 1999.
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xix, 465 pages : illustrations, maps ; 25 cm
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DD257.4 .S59 1999 Adult Non-Fiction Non-Fiction Area

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The question of German unity was the most important and intractable problem to remain unsettled after World War II. W.R. Smyser explores the German Question and uses it to illustrate the story of how Germany was divided and then united against a background of global events and a continuing search for stability in an area that has not known it since the age of Charlemagne. Focusing on the personalities who controlled Germany's fate -- FDR, Churchill, Stalin, Kennedy, Brandt, Reagan, Bush, Gorbachev, Kohl and others -- Smyser creates a masterful portrait of a country that has played a pivotal role in the history of the 20th century.

Reviews 3

Publisher's Weekly Review

From WWII meetings at Casablanca, Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam to the far-flung shuttle diplomacy that brought about German unification, Smyser (The German Economy, etc.) provides a masterful account of diplomatic detail that deserves broad recognition and acclaim. Anything but a dry history, it reflects the high stakes, uncertain distribution of forces and hidden landscapes of risk that forged the Cold War era, dominated by centuries-old concerns for security, self-determination and national honor among all the contending powers. The copious details concern nuances of maneuver, positioning and interpretation that make for compelling drama. Drawing on a full range of sourcesÄfrom diplomatic records, to personal recollections and his own interviewsÄSmyser provides an authoritative, remarkably engaging account. Its two weaknesses are the absence of any discussion of the persistence and resurgence of fascism in Germany, and an insider's insularity of focus and outlook. Smyser faithfully notes how leading figures who kept Berliners' (and all Germans') hopes aliveÄGeneral Lucius Clay during the Berlin airlift, JFK with his "Ich bin ein Berliner" speech, Willy Brandt with his Ost-PolitikÄdid so because their vision and instinct transcended the parameters of normal diplomatic thinking. Nevertheless, in the quality of its prose and the depth of its excavations into diplomatic and political activity, this is a valuable and exciting contribution. Maps, photos. Additional text on Kosovo not seen by PW. (Aug.) (c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved

Library Journal Review

Smyser (The German Economy) sees Germany as the vortex of the Cold War, the most important consideration not only in European politics but in international relations generally for the last 45 years. Even seemingly remote issues such as the Cuban missile crisis are discussed in terms of the German question. Smyser spent many years working on German affairs in the State and Defense departments and has written extensively on the topic. This new title is based on both his work experience and his research in newly opened archives in the former East Germany and the former Soviet Union. He has reconstructed in meticulous detail the negotiations and posturings of the involved powers, attributing more mistakes to the Soviet Union than to the West. He ends with the reunification of Germany, on the optimistic note that the Germany of the 1990s is stronger and better positioned than at any time since Bismarck. Specialists will welcome this thorough and detailed analysis.ÄMarcia L. Sprules, Council on Foreign Relations Lib., New York (c) Copyright 2010. Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.

Choice Review

Smyser's firsthand association with Germany ranges from 1939 through the 1970s. His survey of international politics over Germany and German political developments is thus informed by the personal experiences and perspectives of a man who lived and observed many of the events, conversed with high-level German and American participants, and shared the dominant views of the Cold War, detente, and the post-Iron Curtain and German reunification aftermath. Yet he also keeps close track of the major English and German-language scholarship, published documents, and the press in synthesizing the complex international developments in and around Germany. Smyser emphasizes the most dramatic crises and triumphs with considerable detail to pique the reader's interest, but he does not neglect transitional periods. All of this makes for a popular work that deserves to be widely read. Experts, on the other hand, will find little that is new. All parts of the story have been presented before, but this well-written book is an up-to-date, comprehensive, and balanced account that one can recommend to any interested student or general reader. D. Prowe; Carleton College



Chapter One Making Peace while Making War Adolf Hitler and his "Thousand-Year Reich" met their doom during the winter of 1942-1943, ten years after he had come to power.     Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, beaten at Egypt's El Alamein in October 1942, would never reach the Suez Canal. Field Marshal Friedrich von Paulus surrendered what remained of the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad in February 1943. Five months later, Hitler himself masterminded and lost the greatest armored engagement of all time, the battle of Kursk in Russia. By the summer of 1943, Germany was losing more U-boats than it could build. The Allies had landed successfully in North Africa and Italy. In the Pacific, Japan had lost the crucial naval battle at Midway.     Germany began a wide if slow retreat across Russia, North Africa and Europe. But Hitler fought on, like a third-rate chess player who will not admit defeat until he is checkmated. He and his allies still occupied much of Europe and of the Pacific Ocean. Allied victory would not come quickly. ROOSEVELT, STALIN AND CHURCHILL Like Napoleon, Hitler had spawned a mighty coalition of enemies, which Great Britain's prime minister Winston Churchill called the "Grand Alliance."     The leaders of the Grand Alliance, President Franklin Roosevelt of the United States, Marshal Josef Stalin of the Soviet Union and Churchill himself, knew by 1943 that they would win the war. But they also knew that they would win only if they remained united. Several major campaigns, in France, the Philippines, Germany and Japan, had not even begun. If any ally faltered or withdrew, the others could still lose.     The Allied leaders also knew that they would have to agree on the fate of Germany and its allies. But they had virtually nothing in common except their wish to defeat the Axis powers. Each had his own interests and his own views.     Roosevelt came the closest to being an idealist, although he had made a brilliant political career as a pragmatist. Like most Americans, he believed that the world should no longer be divided into spheres of influence. He did not share Secretary of State Cordell Hull's faith that global problems could best be solved through a new and improved League of Nations. But Roosevelt did believe that Americans could solve international problems better than the Europeans had done.     After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, had brought the United States into the war, Roosevelt had agreed with U.S. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall that postwar political considerations should be subordinated to the needs of victory. Roosevelt attached special importance to gaining and keeping Stalin's confidence until both Germany and Japan were beaten. He thought it would be unwise to make or seek specific commitments about the postwar shape of Europe while the war was going on. But he knew that he would have to begin planning for peace.     Churchill lived in both the idealist and the practical worlds. A master writer and speaker, he relished words that could articulate great ideals. When Hitler's forces threatened England, Churchill's powerful rhetoric helped to mobilize the British people and their friends.     Like Roosevelt, Churchill wanted to keep Stalin fully committed to the war effort. He felt an obligation to Stalin because the Soviet Union carried the burden of the European land war against the Wehrmacht until the Western Allies opened other fronts in Italy and France. Although he knew that Stalin did not share his or Roosevelt's democratic ideals, he wanted to reach arrangements that would keep Stalin in the war.     Stalin, despite his communist ideology, saw the world in the most practical terms of the three leaders. To him, realities mattered more than words. On December 16, 1941, he told British foreign secretary Anthony Eden in Moscow: "Declarations--that is like algebra; treaties or agreements--that is practical arithmetic. We prefer arithmetic to algebra." He dismissed sweeping pledges except for propaganda. He saw little purpose in a new League of Nations after the failure of the last. Stalin did not want a new and untried world order. He wanted precise arrangements that would give the Soviet Union secure borders.     The darkest and most xenophobic of the three leaders, Stalin wanted to outdo the founder of the Soviet Union, Vladimir Lenin, in spreading world revolution and the czars in establishing an empire. But his mistrust of others could work against him. Maxim Litvinov, who had served as Soviet foreign commissar for several years during the 1930s and as ambassador to Washington during the early 1940s, condemned Stalin as narrow-minded and rigid. He complained that Stalin had surrounded himself with the "half-wit" Vyacheslav Molotov, the "careerist" Lavrenti Beria and the "fool" Nikita Khrushchev.     Stalin felt that the West never helped him as much as it should have. He thought that the Allies had not established a European front against Hitler until they had seen that the Soviet Union would dominate Europe if they did not act. He remembered that Lenin had wanted a link with Germany as the key to world revolution. Now Stalin wanted that link. He also wanted recognition as a full global partner.     Whatever their differences, all three Allies agreed that they had to deal harshly with Germany. Having narrowly escaped defeat twice in less than thirty years, all three wanted to make certain that Germany could never threaten them again. Roosevelt toyed actively with permanent dismemberment and perhaps de-industrialization. Stalin and Churchill also wanted to do whatever was necessary to save their nations from more German attacks.     With the prospect of victory before them, Roosevelt and Churchill met in Casablanca, Morocco, in January 1943. Roosevelt seized the occasion to announce that the Allies wanted the "unconditional surrender" of Germany, Italy and Japan. Churchill would have preferred to allow a separate arrangement for Italy, but he fully supported Roosevelt's language and especially unconditional surrender for Germany. It immediately became the main Allied war objective.     Neither Roosevelt nor Churchill had discussed the insistence on unconditional surrender with Stalin before announcing it. Stalin had been invited to Casablanca but had begged off. He supported the demand but let it be known that he would have preferred to be consulted.     By mid-1943 Churchill and Roosevelt wanted to begin more precise discussions with Stalin, especially as they kept hearing rumors (perhaps inspired by the Kremlin itself) of a separate peace between Stalin and Hitler. Eden sent a memorandum to Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov on July 2, proposing that the Allies apply the principles of unconditional surrender to all European Axis states, occupy the defeated states, install control committees to govern occupied territories, and establish a European steering committee that would include large and small victorious powers.     Eden's proposal jolted Stalin into action although he did not formally reply. He decided that the Soviet Union needed to establish its long-term objectives clearly. Realizing the importance of the task, he assigned the responsibility to a committee headed by his close associate Marshal Kliment Voroshilov.     Voroshilov and his committee warned that a peace treaty with Germany might take a long time to reach and that during the interim the Germans might play off the Allies against each other. He argued that Stalin should leave nothing to chance but should make certain that even the initial cease-fire arrangements reflected Soviet security interests and territorial claims. The cease-fire should be designed to serve as an acceptable status for Germany until a peace treaty was signed. The Soviet Union would be safe even if its friends changed their minds after the war was over. Stalin accepted that proposal.     Having recognized that they needed to talk, the three Allied leaders had to decide where. They agreed to meet in Teheran before the end of 1943. That was as far from Soviet territory as Stalin wanted to venture. They also agreed to establish the European Advisory Commission (EAC) as a coordinating and planning body. The EAC was to meet in London on a continuing basis and was to make recommendations on the terms of surrender to be imposed upon each of the European enemy states and on the machinery required to ensure fulfillment of those terms.     The Teheran summit conference served two purposes. The more immediate, but less important one, was to discuss Allied strategy for the remainder of the war. The other, more far-reaching, was to discuss the future shape of Europe. At the meeting, the two purposes came into conflict, for the Allied leaders could not discuss disagreements about the future of Europe while trying to coordinate military plans. In particular, the Western Allies felt that they could not question Stalin's designs too closely while they still needed his help against Germany and perhaps against Japan.     At Teheran, the Allies agreed that Poland's borders should be shifted to the west. Stalin made it clear that the Soviet Union would seize eastern Poland. Churchill then said that Poland might "move westward" to remain viable even if its eastern territories became part of the Soviet Union. He added that "if Poland were to step on some German toes, that could not be helped." Stalin suggested that Polish territory extend as far west as the Oder River.     Using three matches to represent potential borders, Churchill showed Poland moving westward, which apparently pleased Stalin because it showed that Churchill agreed with him. All three Allies concurred that the Oder would mark most of Poland's western border. Stalin also said that the Soviet Union wanted Königsberg in East Prussia as a warm-water port, with neither Roosevelt nor Churchill raising any objection.     The Allies discussed the portion of the Polish-German border south of the Oder but did not decide it clearly. They spoke of the Neisse River serving as that border but did not specify whether they meant the eastern or western Neisse, both of which flowed northward into the Oder but about 200 kilometers (120 miles) apart. They did not use a map during their discussions.     Having decided that Germany would lose its eastern territories to Poland, all three leaders agreed tentatively that the remainder of Germany should be divided into smaller states as it had been before 1871.     Roosevelt proposed splitting Germany into five parts: (1) Prussia to the northeast; (2) Hanover and the lowland part of Germany to the northwest; (3) Saxony and the Leipzig area to the east; (4) Hesse-Darmstadt and Hesse-Kassel to the west; and (5) Bavaria, Baden, and Württemberg to the south. While those five sections would be self-governing, a planned United Nations organization would control such strategically sensitive areas as Kiel, the Kiel canal, and Hamburg as well as the Ruhr and the Saar coal- and steel-producing regions.     Churchill showed some support for Roosevelt's plan but added that he believed that the most important point was to treat Prussia sternly. Other German states could be in some kind of Danubian or other confederation, and things should be made easier for them.     Stalin said that he liked the idea of dividing Germany but wanted to study it further before making concrete proposals. He added that he questioned making new confederations, Danubian or otherwise. He concluded that the Allies would have to recognize that the Germans would want to reunite no matter what division they might impose.     All three agreed that they had only begun to address the future shape of Germany, and they decided to pass the subject to the EAC for further discussion.     By the end of the Teheran Conference, the Big Three leaders of Churchill's Grand Alliance had at least preliminarily decided the general postwar shape of Germany. Germany was to lose Königsberg and all the territory east and northeast of the Oder as well as some territory south of the Oder in Silesia, although the shape and size of the latter area remained unclear. The rest of Germany might be partitioned, but the three Allies had not agreed on the principles to govern that partition. They did not want to argue about details while the war raged. The EAC thus did not follow up with any decision on dismemberment. It did, however, by early 1944, agree on the broad shapes of temporary occupation zones.     Teheran reflected the punitive attitude of the Allies toward the Hitler regime and toward Germany itself. But the Allies thought not only in terms of revenge. They also wanted to prevent another Hitler. The occupation arrangements thus tried to avoid repeating one mistake made at the Versailles peace conference after World War I. This time, the Allies would not let Hitler saddle someone else--especially a democratic government--with the blame for his defeat, as the German military had done with the "stab-in-the-back" charge against the Weimar Republic after 1918. Germany was to be thoroughly defeated, and was to know it, so that the forces of tyranny and militarism would be fully expurgated.     But Roosevelt and Churchill also wanted to avoid the mistake made at Versailles of forcing the German economy to collapse after the war as it had done after World War I. This collapse, which led to staggering inflation followed by ruinous depression, had helped bring Hitler to power.     The "lessons of Versailles," therefore, gave the three Allies and their EAC representatives two mutually contradictory objectives: on the one hand, to punish Germany and especially Hitler and the Nazis for the war; on the other, to avoid putting the Germans into such a desperate situation that they would turn again to political extremism. These contradictory aims were to complicate policy toward the occupation and toward reparations. YALTA DIVIDES GERMANY The Teheran summit left many questions open because the Big Three did not want to jeopardize their cooperation against Hitler. As the war progressed, however, they began to realize that they would have to try to agree on those questions.     Allied armies advanced inexorably. German soldiers sometimes put up fierce resistance, especially on the Russian front, but they had no strategic plan and little incentive to keep fighting. Tens of thousands deserted, although they were shot when caught. Members of the German high command increasingly resented Hitler's irrational orders, which often compelled German forces to remain in indefensible positions, losing not only battles but major units. Those who had long opposed Hitler on moral grounds found friends among those who realized that he would lose the war. They plotted to kill Hitler and tried to do so on July 20, 1944. But the attempt failed, the plotters were hanged on meathooks and the war went on.     Soviet forces became the dominant presence in Europe. By the summer of 1944 they entered Poland. But Stalin did not order a direct advance into Germany. Instead, he ordered the Red Army to conquer all of eastern Europe and the Balkans on a wide front. The Red Army stood at the Oder River only at the beginning of 1945. By then the Western Allies had reached Germany's western borders.     The Allies tried to advance on the diplomatic front as their armies were advancing on the military front. But they could not agree on what was to become of the country they were defeating. Their delegates to the European Advisory Commission differed on many basic issues. The EAC delegates could not agree on how long an Allied control system was to function, although they did agree that it should be temporary. Nor could they decide on a longer-term regime to succeed the occupation. They produced no formal political document of surrender, no common occupation policy declaration, no dismemberment plan and no reparations schedule. They could not even agree on whether the Allies should leave some German authority in place after they entered Germany.     The EAC delegates did, however, concur that each zonal commander would have supreme authority in his zone while broad policy was to be made by unanimous agreement in an Allied Control Council (ACC). This virtually decided the division of Germany because each occupier could do as he wished in his zone and could veto any policy to be applied all across Germany. Both the U.S. and Soviet forces insisted on these rules because they did not want their commanders subject to outside control.     The EAC also produced three largely technical agreements: (1) draft instructions for German unconditional surrender, (2) a protocol on the occupation zones and Berlin, and (3) an agreement on the control machinery for Germany.     The EAC agreed on the outline of the occupation zones by early 1944, but only in September did Roosevelt agree to accept the zone in southern Germany that the others had assigned to the United States. He had wanted the northwest area because he mistrusted the French Resistance leader Charles de Gaulle and did not want U.S. forces to depend on supply routes through France. He had also wanted the Ruhr. But Churchill had argued that British forces had always been north of U.S. forces during the Allied advance, and shifting forces around would be very difficult. Roosevelt finally accepted Churchill's argument, but did not like having the U.S. occupation zone landlocked. He made more careful arrangements for transit traffic through the British zone than he ever made for traffic to Berlin through the Soviet zone. Allied leaders faced policy disagreements at home as well as abroad. The fiercest took place in Washington and concerned the long-term future of Germany. Secretary of the Treasury Henry J. Morgenthau proposed turning Germany into an agricultural country to make certain that it could never again constitute a threat. Morgenthau also wanted total dismemberment of Germany and deliberate creation of economic chaos. Both Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Secretary of War Henry Stimson opposed the Morgenthau Plan, as it came to be known. They thought that U.S. interests in Europe would be better served by having a prosperous and democratic instead of an impoverished and vengeful Germany. Roosevelt first accepted and then abandoned the Morgenthau Plan, although it was to surface again in U.S. occupation policy.     American attitudes toward Germany began to shift as it became evident that relations with Moscow might deteriorate after the war. The U.S. government began to hear ever more worrisome reports about Soviet intentions. George Kennan, counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, wrote at the end of 1944 that the United States could not hope for cooperation with the Soviet Union in Europe.     In London as in Washington, foreign policy experts argued that Germany would have to be permitted and perhaps encouraged to reemerge as a viable state because Europe needed a stable Germany for economic survival and to help hold back the Soviet Union strategically. But Churchill himself wanted to punish Germany more than his experts did.     French leaders had their own differences. They had begun to discuss postwar plans for Germany during 1943, but they received very little information about the ideas being discussed in Washington, London or Moscow. Some of the leaders of the French Resistance, including de Gaulle, favored a return to the military controls over Germany tried after World War I. Others, however, including some French socialists, believed that France and Europe should befriend Germany and integrate it into a future West European confederation.     By 1944, as de Gaulle became the leader of the new French government, his views became French policy. He wanted to detach all the land west of the Rhine River from Germany, with most of it to be under French occupation although some parts were to be under the Belgian or Dutch flags. De Gaulle said that France would not annex those parts of Germany but that "the flag of the French army" would fly over them. He wanted the French occupation zone to cover most of Baden-Württemberg, including the city of Stuttgart. He also wanted France to have its own full share of reparations.     De Gaulle saw a parallel with Poland. As Stalin wanted the land east of the Oder for Poland, de Gaulle wanted the land west of the Rhine for France. He wanted the Ruhr to be permanently removed from German sovereignty, to be internationalized, and to have its mineral resources and its steel mills expropriated and turned over to an international authority that would trade freely with all the states of the world including Germany. While others thought and planned, the Red Army took control of eastern Europe. Churchill flew to Moscow in October 1944 to try to apply his spheres-of-influence concept. He gave Stalin a paper proposing the following division of influence between Moscow and the West: Romania:  Bulgaria:  Yugoslavia: Hungary:  Greece:    90 percent Moscow/10 percent West 75 percent Moscow/25 percent West 50 percent Moscow/50 percent West 50 percent Moscow/50 percent West 10 percent Moscow/90 percent West     Stalin glanced at the paper and initialed it instantaneously. Churchill thought the initials signaled agreement. More likely, though, they signaled derision. Stalin already occupied all the listed states except Greece and parts of Yugoslavia. He could dismiss Churchill's percentages as irrelevant, for he himself would decide what would really happen in all of eastern Europe and over most of central Europe.     Stalin showed his power even more clearly when the two men discussed Poland. Stalin insisted that the Polish people had shown their preference for the so-called Lublin government, which the Red Army had brought to Poland, and that it would govern until a more permanent government might be chosen. Churchill could not change Stalin's mind, for the Soviet dictator intended to exercise full influence over Poland.     Stalin and Churchill also discussed the future of Germany, with both considering some form of dismemberment. Stalin reiterated that he wanted the city of Königsberg. But they agreed that no firm decisions could be made without Roosevelt's participation at another summit.     De Gaulle made his own pilgrimage to Moscow two months later. When he told Stalin that France wanted all of Germany west of the Rhine River, Stalin said he would not accept that. De Gaulle also told Stalin that France wanted a treaty with the Soviet Union. Stalin agreed. They signed a treaty of mutual assistance on December 10, 1944.     The separate bilateral talks and the futile EAC sessions showed that the Big Three needed to meet again. No other forum could decide the future of Germany. If there was ever to be a common policy, only Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin could define it. Between February 4 and 12, 1945, the Big Three met at the resort town of Yalta in the Crimea. The Western Allies did not want to go there but Stalin would not leave Russia. De Gaulle tried to visit all of the Big Three capitals just before the Yalta Conference to present his views and demand admittance, but Roosevelt and Churchill would not receive him.     The Yalta Conference opened under the somber reality of the Red Army's occupation of eastern Europe. Roosevelt and Churchill recognized that they had little chance to bring Western-style freedom to Poland and its neighbors, but they believed that they still had to try. They also needed to discuss Germany. Roosevelt wanted to get two additional items: Stalin's agreement on a United Nations voting formula and his pledge to join the war against Japan as soon as possible after the Allies had defeated Hitler.     Early during their meetings at Yalta, Roosevelt told Stalin that he did not expect U.S. forces to remain in Germany more than two years after the end of hostilities. Such a swift withdrawal would leave Great Britain and France as the sole major Western powers in Europe. That prospect colored all discussion on Germany at Yalta.     Unlike Teheran, the Yalta meeting did not dwell on military matters. The war had virtually ended. The Western and the Soviet armies would soon meet somewhere in defeated Germany, although no one could predict exactly where or when. The Big Three could thus concentrate on the postwar settlement.     The Big Three discussed Germany several times. For the most part, they approved the documents produced by the European Advisory Commission. All knew that those texts did not resolve the truly difficult issues, but they still preferred to ignore those issues when they could.     The discussion over possible dismemberment of Germany did not go as it had at Teheran. Roosevelt did not repeat his previous proposal. Churchill said that he favored dismemberment "in principle," but he did not repeat his earlier suggestions either. He had already come to believe that the West would need a united Germany to balance Soviet power in Europe. Stalin opposed dismemberment openly. But the Big Three did not want to dismiss the notion completely, so they decided to establish a Dismemberment Committee to study "the procedure for the dismemberment of Germany."     The principals did approve EAC proposals for three occupation zones in Germany as well as for a Berlin divided into three sectors. They decided to accept the borders between those zones and sectors as temporary dividing lines.     The leaders further agreed that France would receive an occupation zone, although Stalin insisted that it should be taken out of the U.S. and British occupation areas. Stalin also agreed to give France a seat on the Allied Control Council. But he did so only toward the end of the conference in response to a personal appeal from Roosevelt. He clearly did not like de Gaulle's plans for Germany.     The Yalta Conference may have agreed on occupation zones, but it did not agree on reparations. Although Stalin urged Roosevelt and Churchill in the strongest terms to grant major reparations to compensate the Soviet Union for its World War II losses, he could not win them over.     Stalin presented a plan under which Germany would pay $20 billion in reparations, with half of that amount to go to the Soviet Union. For two years, German industry was to be dismantled and shipped as reparations. After that, Germany was to pay reparations in kind for another ten years.     Churchill and Roosevelt recognized that the Soviet Union deserved reparations. But they would not accept a specific target, especially such a high one. Roosevelt feared that the United States and other Western countries would end up paying the bill as they had after World War I because they would be forced to rebuild the German economy after it had been destroyed for reparations. Churchill shared those fears.     Roosevelt and Churchill did not believe that they needed to provide indefinite help to Moscow. After all, the United States and Great Britain had helped the Soviet Union during the war itself. They had sent Moscow over 10 million tons of armaments, costing a total of more than $6 billion, and about a third as much again in non-military aid. The shipments had included food as well as thousands of tanks, artillery pieces and trucks, absolutely essential to Stalin's war effort.     Stalin became angry during the final Yalta discussion on this topic. He reminded the Western leaders that the Soviet Union had suffered more from the war than any other country. At that point, Roosevelt wanted to accept Stalin's demands, but Churchill refused. Finally, at Roosevelt's urging, Churchill reluctantly accepted the $20 billion figure as a "basis for discussion" but not as an agreed figure. The Yalta reparations protocol stated that the British delegation believed that "no figure on reparations should be mentioned."     The Yalta agreement to disagree over reparations left the wartime alliance shaken. It must have frustrated Stalin, whose military position was never more dominant than at the time of the Yalta Conference. But he also must have recognized that he could not do much. The most important reparations would have to come from the Ruhr industrial basin, an area in the projected British zone of occupation and which Western troops would reach first.     While the Allies could perhaps postpone some decisions about Germany, they could not postpone decisions about Poland, the problem that dominated the Yalta Conference. They focused mainly on two issues: Poland's western borders, which directly affected Germany as well as Poland, and Poland's future government, which affected Germany less directly but would change the West's perception of Stalin and thus Western thinking about Germany. (Continues...)

Table of Contents

Paul H. Nitze
Mapsp. ix
Forewordp. xiii
Prefacep. xvii
Introduction: Bismarck and the German Questionp. 1
Chapter 1. Making Peace while Making Warp. 5
Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchillp. 5
Yalta Divides Germanyp. 10
Truman Joins at Potsdamp. 17
Chapter 2. The Occupation Beginsp. 27
The West Meets Molotovp. 27
Stalin Takes Over His Zonep. 31
Bevin, Byrnes and Bidault Link the Western Zonesp. 42
Chapter 3. Stalin's Indecisionp. 53
Cold Days in Moscowp. 53
Swept Up in Confrontation Rhetoricp. 61
Why Germany Was Dividedp. 67
Chapter 4. The Berlin Airliftp. 73
The D-Mark and the Blockadep. 75
Clay Invents Strategic Liftp. 78
Stalin Ends the Blockadep. 85
Chapter 5. Political Divisionp. 89
Adenauer Forms the Federal Republic of Germanyp. 89
Ulbricht Forms the German Democratic Republicp. 96
Acheson and the North Atlantic Treatyp. 101
Chapter 6. War in Asia, Warning in Germanyp. 105
Kim Il Sung Launches the Bundeswehrp. 106
Monnet, Schuman and Adenauer Create Europep. 109
Stalin's Final Tryp. 113
Beria and the Berlin Uprisingp. 119
Chapter 7. The Lines Hardenp. 127
Eden Brings West Germany into NATOp. 127
Divided Europep. 129
The Strategic Equationp. 133
The Splitp. 135
Chapter 8. The Berlin Ultimatump. 137
Khrushchev Sets a Deadlinep. 138
The Allies Debatep. 140
Eisenhower Tries Summitryp. 143
Chapter 9. The Wallp. 149
Kennedy's Trial by Firep. 152
Ulbricht Gets His Wallp. 156
The Allies Thank Ulbrichtp. 160
Chapter 10. The Battle for West Berlinp. 167
Clay Makes His Movep. 168
Tanks at Checkpoint Charliep. 172
Kennedy Probesp. 178
Khrushchev's End Run to Cubap. 183
Chapter 11. De Gaulle Moves Inp. 193
Adenauer Thanks de Gaullep. 194
Kennedy Becomes a Berlinerp. 196
Winners, Losers, and Twice Divided Europep. 199
Chapter 12. The Poisoned Chalicep. 203
Germans Face the German Questionp. 204
Three Men and a Pregnant Phrasep. 210
Kiesinger Manages the Transitionp. 214
Chapter 13. Detente in Moscowp. 225
Nixon and Brandt Open Doorsp. 225
Egon, Leo and Slavap. 230
Brandt Kneels in Warsawp. 241
Once Again, Keystone Berlinp. 243
Chapter 14. Detente in Germanyp. 251
Odd Man Outp. 251
Wrapping Up the Berlin Accordp. 255
The West Coordinatesp. 258
The Two Germanysp. 260
Chapter 15. Brandt's Brief Triumphp. 265
The Bundestag Mysteryp. 266
Honecker and the Fall of Brandtp. 267
Turning the Cornerp. 269
Chapter 16. Brezhnev Alters the Bargainp. 273
Schmidt and Honecker Take Overp. 274
Brezhnev Enters the Gray Areap. 278
The Dreamer and the Macherp. 283
The End of Schmidtp. 289
Chapter 17. Moscow Under Pressurep. 295
Reagan and Kohl Deploy the Euro-Missilesp. 295
The Man from Dixon and the Man from Stavropolp. 303
Gorbachev Reverses His Alliancesp. 310
The "Coalition of Reason,"p. 317
Chapter 18. Bursting through the Wallp. 327
The Hungarian Gatep. 328
Kurt Masur, the Kapellmeister of Leipzigp. 330
The Hated Stonesp. 340
Why the Revolt?p. 346
Chapter 19. Putting Germany Together Againp. 351
Kohl Takes Controlp. 351
The Occupation Powers Set Conflicting Termsp. 364
Two Plus Four Makes Fivep. 372
Bush and Worner Change NATOp. 385
Moscow and Berlin: A New Rapallo?p. 392
Chapter 20. The New German Questionp. 397
Cold War Legaciesp. 398
The "Berlin Republic,"p. 402
The Europe of Berlinp. 408
Another German-American Century?p. 411
The Third German Questionp. 415
Notesp. 419
Indexp. 457