Cover image for Unvanquished : a U.S.-U.N. saga
Unvanquished : a U.S.-U.N. saga
Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 1922-2016.
First edition.
Publication Information:
New York : Random House, [1999]

Physical Description:
352 pages ; 25 cm
General Note:
Includes index.
Format :


Call Number
Material Type
Home Location
Item Holds
JZ4997.5.U55 B68 1999 Adult Non-Fiction Central Closed Stacks

On Order



"In this book Boutros-Ghali argues that U.S. policy toward the United Nations threatens the fragile fabric of the international organization. By selectively consulting the Security Council, the United States has frequently condemned the United Nations to the status of scapegoat in international affairs, notably during peacekeeping missions in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda. Meanwhile, the United Nations's financial crisis persists as the United States fails to pay its bills while seeking to further increase its already considerable influence within the organization." "In October 1995 President Clinton lavishly praised Boutros-Ghali for his "outstanding leadership," and thanked him for his "vision." Yet, a mere four months later, the Clinton administration decided that Boutros-Ghali would have to go. What happened in that short time to convince the United States that the secretary-general was now a liability? United States domestic electoral politics were decisive: While campaigning for the primaries, Bob Dole was scoring heavily by repeatedly ridiculing Boutros-Ghali. To neutralize Dole's challenge, Clinton denied the controversial secretary-general a second term, vetoing his reelection in the Security Council despite unanimous support from its other members." "Boutros-Ghali reveals the dramatic conflict and the personalities involved and considers the future of the United Nations in light of American domination."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved

Reviews 3

Booklist Review

One might not have noticed from the American media, but the decision by the U.S. to oppose a second term for Boutros-Ghali as secretary-general of the UN was big news in much of the rest of the world. As the Egyptian diplomat tells the story, his problems seem to have had more to do with U.S. politics--the Republican revolution of 1994 and the '96 presidential election--than with the critical issues with which the international body was dealing at the time. Boutros-Ghali covers "the United Nations' most controversial, difficult, and portentous problems" during his stewardship: Somalia, Bosnia, Libya, Cambodia, Haiti--the list is long, and Boutros-Ghali provides thoughtful commentary on how the UN and its members struggled to cope with each knotty issue. Given the author's conviction that "any secretary-general . . . must advocate the cause of the developing countries," it's no surprise that he devotes a chapter to Africa and another to the Mideast. But the biggest "news" in Boutros-Ghali's reflections is his cogent critique of U.S. diplomacy (and lack of same) as the UN debated a series of international crises and, ultimately, his own future role. Boutros-Ghali argues that the UN must adapt to the post^-cold war world and that, so far, the U.S. has generally obstructed its adaptation. --Mary Carroll

Library Journal Review

The conflict between the United States and the United Nations‘as seen by the U.N.'s former secretary-general. (c) Copyright 2010. Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.

Choice Review

Boutros-Ghali's book is a superbly crafted narrative biography of his years as UN Secretary-General (1991-96). An erudite diplomat, he offers a very objective and persuasive story of the tug-of-war between Washington and the UN in the mid-90s on several different issues--Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia. One easily sees the seeds of Kosovo in the inside controversies over Bosnia. The purpose of the book is to convey Boutros-Ghali's interpretation of the reasons for the US refusal, even under maximum pressure from the rest of the international community, to support him for a second term as secretary-general. He does not engage in personal attacks on key US officials, particularly Madeleine Albright and Warren Christopher, but gives his version of events in very convincing terms. He is particularly effective in pointing out the discrepancies between what key actors said and what they did. Both critics and supporters of US policy could learn much from this thoughtful analysis. Some of the issues Boutros-Ghali covers are again in play with Secretary-General Annan. Recommended for upper-division undergraduates, graduate students, faculty, and practitioners. J. D. Stempel; University of Kentucky