Cover image for Dennett and his critics : demystifying mind
Dennett and his critics : demystifying mind
Dahlbom, Bo, 1949-
Publication Information:
Oxford, UK ; Cambridge, Mass., USA : Blackwell, [1995]

Physical Description:
vii, 247 pages : illustrations ; 23 cm.
General Note:
"Bibliography of the publications of Daniel C. Dennett"--P. [236]-243.
Viruses of the mind / Richard Dawkins -- Filling in : why Dennett is wrong / P.S. Churchland and V. S. Ramachandran -- Pattern and being / John Haugeland -- Is intentional ascription intrinsically normative? / Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore -- Logic, mind, and mathematics / Colin McGinn -- On mentalese orthography / Ruth Garrett Millikan -- What is it like to be boring and myopic? / Kathleen Akins -- Mind is artificial / Bo Dahlbom -- Holism, intrinsicality, and the ambition of transcendence / Richard Rorty -- Back from the drawing board / Daniel Dennett.
Added Author:
Format :


Call Number
Material Type
Home Location
Central Library B945.D394 D46 1995 Adult Non-Fiction Central Closed Stacks

On Order



Daniel Dennett is arguably one of the most influential yet radical philosophers in America today. In this volume, Dennett is confronted by colleagues and critics, from philosophy, biology and psychology. His reply constitutes an extensive essay which clarifies, and develops further, central themes in his philosophy. The debate ranges over Dennett's whole corpus, but special attention is given to his major work on consciousness, Consciousness Explained.

The volume includes a critical assessement of Dennett's views on behaviouralism and the subjectivity of consciousness, the nature of perception and mental representation, intentional laws and computational psychology, the rationality of thought, culture as a virus, the architecture of mind, and the role of artifacts in thinking. Also included is an introduction to Dennett's philosophy and a full bibliography of his publications.

Reviews 1

Choice Review

Dahlbom (Univ. of Link"oping, Sweden) collects nine essays and writes a general introduction on issues central to the philosophical work of Daniel Dennett. Contributors include Richard Dawkins, Jerry Fodor, Richard Rorty, and Patricia Churchland. All but one of the essays are previously unpublished; Dennett supplies a 30-page reply. Most of the contributors pay special attention to Dennett's 1991 book, Consciousness Explained, which proposes that there really is no such thing as consciousness, at least as it is ordinarily understood. In reply to Rorty, Dennett claims that in ordinary empirical investigations there is an independent fact of the matter, but that "when we confront the Observer,... the distinction between the 'for me' and the 'in itself' breaks down." Dennett regards correctness in claims about the mind as somehow relative to people offering those claims. He thus denies that the domain of the mind yields the kind of independent facts of the matter familiar from typical scientific inquiry. This view puzzles many of Dennett's critics. Recommended for libraries supporting work on the philosophy of mind at advanced undergraduate level and above. P. K. Moser; Loyola University of Chicago

Table of Contents

Notes on Contributors
Editor's Introduction
1 Viruses of the MindRichard Dawkins
2 Filling in: Why Dennett is WrongP. S. Churchland and V. S. Ramachandran
3 Pattern and BeingJohn Hagueland
4 Is Intentional Ascription Intrinsically Normative?Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore
5 Logic, Mind and MathematicsColin McGinn
6 On Mentalese OrthographyRuth Garrett Millikan
7 What is it Like to be Boring and Myopic?Kathleen Akins
8 Mind is ArtificialBo Dahlbom
9 Holism, Intrinsically, and the Ambition of TranscendenceRichard Rorty
10 Back from the Drawing BoardDaniel Dennett
Bibligraphy of the Publications of Daniel C. Dennett

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